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Murray v. Giarratano,109 S. Ct. at 2781, n. 25, and they are made if
aprose inmate can raise at least one non-frivolous claim in his/her
petition. However, petitions with a chance for ultimate success
usually claim ineffective assistance of counsel or denial of Brady

materials and these claims are difficult for apro se petitioner to assert
without necessary investigative services.
Summary and analysis by: Catherine M. Hobart

POWELL v. TEXAS
109 S. Ct. 3146,106 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1989)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
(The following facts were undisputed.)
On the day of petitioner's arrest, the trial court, at the State's
request ordered that a psychiatric examination be performed to
determine (1) petitioner's competency to stand trial and (2) his sanity
at the time of the offense. In all, petitioner was examined on six
occasions by two doctors. Neither petitioner nor his counsel was
notified that the examination would encompass the issue of future
dangerousness; nor was petitioner informed of his right to remain
silent. Finally, over petitioner's objection, both doctors testified at the
sentencing hearing, their opinion based on these examinations, that
petitioner "would commit future acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." 109 S. CL at 3148, quoting 742
S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en bane).
Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death. Petitioner sought review asserting that evidence received
during the penalty phase of his trial violated his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights. The United States Supreme Court, 108 S.Ct.
2891, vacated the Texas court's judgment and remanded for further
consideration in light of Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.
CL 1792, 100 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1988)(held, inter alia, that neither the
placement of the State's motions nor the court's ex parte orders for
psychiatric testimony satisfied the notice requirement to defense
counsel that such evaluation of defendant's future dangerousness
would occur). On remand, the Texas court reinstated its prior
decision. The Court, noting that this precise question was before the
Court for the second time, reversed the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals because that decision was inconsistent with its
decisions in Satterwhitev. Texas, supra,and Estelle v. Smith, 451
U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 68 L. Ed. 2d359 (1981).
HOLDING
The Supreme Court held that: (1) [the] defendant was deprived
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when psychiatric examinations were performed by state experts, without notice to defendant or
his attorney that the examinations would encompass [the] issue of
future dangerousness, and (2) defendant's introduction of psychiatric
testimony in support of defense of insanity did not waive his Sixth
Amendment right to notification. 109 S.Ct at 3146.
ANALYSIS
In Estelle v. Smith, supra, the Court held that a capital defendant's Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination
precludes the State from subjecting him to a psychiatric examination
concerning future dangerousness without first informing the
defendant that he has a right to remain silent and that anything he
says can be used against him. Powell, citing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 461469. In Estelle, the Court unanimously held that, once a capital
defendant is formally charged, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
precludes examination without notification that "the psychiatric

examination (will) encompass the issue of their client's future
dangerousness." Id. at 471.
Despite the close similarity between the facts of this case and
those in Estelle, the Court of Criminal Appeals alternatively held: (1)
that petitioner's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated,
742 S.W.2d at 357-359, and (2) even if they were, that the error was
harmless, id., at 359-360. After granting a writ of certiorari, the
Supreme Court vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded the
case for further consideration in light of Satterwhite. The Court of
Criminal Appeals simply withdrew the portion which relied on
harmless-error analysis and retained the remaining holdings, over one
dissenting opinion. The court reasoned that petitioner not only
waived his right to object to the State's use of psychiatric testimony
to rebut his defense, but also waived his right to its use to satisfy the
State's burden of proving future dangerousness. Id. at 358-359.
Finding faulty Fifth and Sixth Amendment analysis and no support
for this conclusion, the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court
declined to address whether a waiver (by the defendant) of the right
to object to the use of psychiatric testimony at the guilt phase of a
capital trial extends to the sentencing phase as well.
Support for the lower court's decision on the waiver issue is
found primarily in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Battie v. Estelle, 655
F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1981). In that case, the Court of Appeals suggested
that if a defendant introduces psychiatric testimony to establish a
mental-status defense, the government may be justified in also using
such testimony to rebut the defense notwithstanding the defendant's
assertion that the psychiatric examination was conducted in violation
of his right against self-incrimination. Id. at 701-702. The Supreme
Court went on to state that in such circumstances, "the defendant's
use of psychiatric testimony might constitute a waiver of the Fifth
Amendment privilege, just as the privilege would be waived if the
defendant himself took the stand." Id. at 701-702, n.22. The Court of
Appeals explained that "any burden imposed on the defense by this
result is justified by the State's overwhelming difficulty in responding to the defense psychiatric testimony without its own psychiatric
examination of the accused and by the need to prevent fraudulent
mental defenses." Id. at 702.
The Supreme Court, however, was quick to point out that Battie
dealt exclusively with the Fifth Amendment privilege and that the
Fifth Circuit was not passing on a separate Sixth Amendment
challenge. 109 S.Ct. at 3149, citing, 655 F.2d, at 694, n. 2. The Court
observes that Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues must be discussed
separately since distinct analyses apply. Noting that while it may be
unfair to the State to deny the State a means of rebutting defendant's
psychiatric testimony, the Court concludes it certainly is not unfair to
require the State to provide counsel with notice prior to examination
on the issue of future dangerousness. Id. at 3149.
The distinction between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
analyses was recognized in Buchananv. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 107
S. Ct. 2906, 97 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1987). In Buchanan, the Court held
that a defendant waived his Fifth Amendment privilege by raising a
mental status defense, but in a separate section of the opinion the
Court addressed the Sixth Amendment issue, concluding counsel
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knew of the scope of the examination before it took place. Unlike
Buchanan, petitioner did not know the examination would involve the
issue of future dangerousness. Because this evidence was taken in
deprivation of petitioner's right to assistance of counsel without a
showing of waiver of this right, the Supreme Court ruled that Smith
and Satterwhite control and reversed the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals.
In Virginia, a potential problem exists because an evaluation
may be performed on the issue of competency to stand trial (V.C.A.
§19.2-169.1), sanity at the time of the offense (V.C.A. §19.2-169.5),

or when defendant's mental condition is relevant to capital sentencing (V.C.A. §19.2-264.3:1, see article this issue). In Virginia, future
dangerousness is one of the statutory aggravating factors sufficient to
support a death sentence. At any of the aforementioned examinations,
the defendant could make statements to the mental health expert
which could be considered relevant to the issue of future dangerousness. Left unanswered is the question, what are counsel's rights and
duties upon notification?
Summary and analysis by: Elizabeth A. Bennett

EVANS v. THOMPSON
881 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1989)
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Petitioner Wilbert Lee Evans shot and killed Deputy Sheriff
William Truesdale while attempting to escape from state custody. In
June 1981, petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced
to death in the Circuit Court of Alexandria, Virginia.
On March 28, 1983, Virginia enacted emergency legislation,
amending its procedures for trial by jury in capital cases to permit
capital resentencing by a newly impaneled jury where a prior death
sentence was vacated due to sentencing errors. Va. Code Ann. §19.2264.3(c). Previously, if the Commonwealth failed to secure a valid
death sentence due to errors in the sentencing process, it was
foreclosed from seeking capital resentencing and the defendant
received an automatic sentence of life imprisonment. Pattersonv.
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 653, 283 S.E.2d 212 (1981). On April 12,
1983, the Commonwealth confessed that erroneous evidence of
petitioner's prior convictions had been admitted during the sentencing phase of the trial. Petitioner's death sentence was thereafter
vacated and a new jury was impaneled for resentencing in accordance
with the new statute. After hearing evidence of petitioner's history of
violent criminal conduct, the new jury recommended that the death
penalty be imposed based upon a finding of petitioner's "future
dangerousness." In March 1984, the trial court imposed the death
penalty. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the sentence.
In May 1986, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in Alexandria Circuit Court. The Circuit Court dismissed this
petition. The Virginia Supreme Court, as well as the United States
Supreme Court, denied review.
Petitioner then sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern
District of Virginia. Among other things, petitioner claimed that his
resentencing was barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause and the
protection against prosecutorial misconduct guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause. He further claimed that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The district court
rejected his petition and Evans thereafter appealed to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals.

In holding that Petitioner was not denied any of his rights, the
Fourth Circuit explained that the rationale of the Ex Post Facto
Clause is to assure fair notice of the nature and consequences of
criminal behavior and to prevent the alteration of pre-existing rules
subsequent to the commission of an act. In order for an ex post facto
claim to be valid, the law must be retrospective and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it. However, "No ex post facto
violation occurs if the change in the law is merely procedural and
does 'not increase the punishment, nor change the ingredients of the
offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt.' Miller v.
Florida,482 U.S. 423, 433, 107 S. Ct. 2446, 2452-2453 (1987),
quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590,4 S. Ct. 202,210 (1884).
See also United States v. JuvenileMale, 819 F.2d 468, 470-471 (4th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Mest, 789 F.2d 1069, 1071 (4th Cir.
1986). The Fourth Circuit held that the new statute does no more
than change the procedures surrounding the imposition of the death
penalty. The nature and consequences of petitioner's criminal
behavior were not changed and therefore petitioner had fair warning
that the death penalty was a possible punishment and could not have
been disadvantaged by the new statute.
b) ProsecutorialMisconduct
Petitioner also argued that the state prosecutors violated his due
process rights when they knowingly proffered false conviction
records at his original sentencing hearing and then deliberately
delayed confessing error until after the 1983 statute was enacted.
Petitioner claimed that this type of prosecutorial misconduct barred
his resentencing.
The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, relying on the state
court's finding that the government acted in good faith. A state court
finding that the government acted in good faith where defendant
alleges he has been the victim of intentional or purposeful government misconduct, is entitled to a presumption of correctness.
Sanderson v. Rice, 777 F.2d 902, 909 (4th Cir. 1985). In concluding
that the state court's findings did not lack fair support in the record,
the Fourth Circuit determined that the prosecutors were only guilty of
unintentional errors and that these errors were remedied when
petitioner received a new sentencing proceeding free of false or
misleading evidence.

HOLDING
a) Ex PostFactoClaim
Petitioner claimed that since his offense and trial occurred
before the new statute was promulgated, his resentencing should have
been barred by the holding in Pattersonv. Commonwealth, supra.
Petitioner, thus alleged, under an ex post facto theory, that he was
retroactively deprived of his right to have his death sentence
converted to life imprisonment.

c) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner further alleged that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. First, petitioner claimed that
his trial counsel improperly failed to object to the prosecution's
assertion, in his closing argument, that petitioner was a multiple
murderer. Second, petitioner argued that on direct appeal his counsel
failed to discover and inform the court that his death sentence was
based on false evidence.

